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Abstract 
This paper attempts to delineate the evolution of the Turkish banking sector in the post-
crisis era after 2001. The paper summarizes the events in the Turkish banking sector 
until the 2001 crisis. After that, a section focuses on the major regulatory changes. A 
detailed account of the consolidation and transformation of Turkish banks following the 
crisis is presented with reference to various structural indicators of the sector. Efficiency 
and foreign bank entry are examined in for the post-crisis period as well.  
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Transformation of the Turkish Financial Sector in the Aftermath of 
the 2001 Crisis  
G. Gülsün Akına, Ahmet Faruk Aysanb, Levent Yıldıranc 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Turkish financial sector has shown remarkable progress in the period following the 
2001 crisis. The improved macroeconomic conditions in the country, the increased 
fiscal discipline of the government and the restructuring of the institutional setting for 
the financial system were among the domestic causes of this development. Very 
favorable international liquidity conditions, international institutions’ influences and the 
reforms in global banking standards were also profoundly effective factors during this 
transformation. Banking constitutes the major component of Turkey’s financial sector. 
In 2008, banks’ balance sheets comprised 88 per cent of the balance sheets of the sector 
(Table 1). Hence, this paper will analyze the developments in the banking sector to 
evaluate the financial sector’s progress since 2001. 
 
The catastrophic crises in 2000 and 2001 paved the way for a structural reform process 
in Turkey. Since the weaknesses in the banking sector were considered to be a major 
cause for the crises, efforts to restructure the Turkish economy were particularly 
focused on the banking sector. Extensive research was conducted in the immediate post-
crisis era to analyze the crises and to evaluate these efforts. The more recent period up 
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to 2008 in which some results of the restructuring and transformation have surfaced 
remains unexplored. This paper attempts to fill this gap. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
In the 1980s, the planned economy with its heavily restricted banking sector left its 
place to the changes effected by the attempts of liberalization in the Turkish economy, 
in sync with the rising neoliberalism in the world. Despite considerable improvements, 
the lack of an institutional structure was a major impediment. The 1990s were marked 
by high inflation, increasing public expenditures and excessive public sector borrowing. 
In this decade the government turned mainly to commercial banks, which in turn relied 
on short-term capital inflows, for deficit financing. Banks had little function as financial 
intermediaries; their main business was to lend to the government at high rates and 
borrow from abroad by exposing themselves to serious currency risk. State banks, 
which constituted a significant portion of the banking sector, were also largely used by 
the government to accomplish political objectives. They suffered duty losses for which 
they engaged in short-term borrowing at high interest rates, subjecting themselves to 
interest rate risk.  
 
A confidence breakdown, the ensuing capital flight and the consequent rush to foreign 
currency led to the collapse of the IMF-supported exchange rate anchor program of 
1999. The heavy depreciation of the currency resulted in the severe 2001 crisis, 
affecting especially the banks with serious open positions. As a result of this crisis, the 
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banking sector had to go through immense restructuring, with the total cost of the 
process amounting to 35.9 per cent of GDP in 2001 (Steinherr et al. 2004). 
 
There was at least one good side to this devastating crisis. It provided regulators with 
the suitable environment to initiate a structural reform process. The Banking Regulation 
and Supervision Agency (BRSA) implemented a series of fundamental regulations on 
many issues including foreign exchange exposure, connected lending practices and 
capital adequacy standards. State banks were relieved of the burden of duty losses and 
some measures were taken to enhance their efficiency. The convergence of the 
regulatory framework to international standards and the proactive policies of the 
regulators are among the main reasons for the current soundness of the financial sector. 
Basel-II was the international benchmark for determining the regulatory framework. 
Redefining the risk groups of certain balance sheets assets, and increasing the 
provisions for certain off-balance sheet items and credit card installments are some 
examples of the proactive measures taken by the regulators in order to control banks’ 
asset growth and risk taking. Regulations were accompanied with improving 
macroeconomic conditions and the tight fiscal practices of the government on the 
domestic front. Meanwhile, favorable global liquidity conditions prevailed in 
international markets. 
 
In the post-crisis period, the number of banks in Turkey decreased until 2006 and has 
stayed at 50 since. Their asset and liability structure reflects financial deepening and 
increased intermediation activities. Profitability has been on the rise since 2005, and is 
now quite high compared to most European countries. Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 
 5
has been declining, mostly due to stricter regulations and the increasing share of loans 
in assets in recent years, though it is above the required minimum of 8 per cent and the 
CARs of most European countries. 
 
The duration between the crisis and 2004 can be described as the recovery and 
stabilization period due to the intense restructuring activities that characterize it. In this 
period, the banking sector was consolidated through mergers and made leaner through 
reductions in the numbers of branches and employees. This was also a recovery phase 
during which asset portfolios were rehabilitated and the capital base was strengthened. 
Starting with 2004, the Turkish banking sector entered a growth period. Total assets as 
percentage of GDP increased substantially and reached 71.5 in 2008. The numbers of 
branches and employees started to escalate in 2004. Securitization and syndication 
credits received by them surged in this period as well. These years were also marked 
with a sudden increase in foreign bank entry. The share of assets owned by foreign 
banks increased nearly tenfold between 2000 and 2008, with almost all of this growth 
taking place in 2005 and later.  
 
Global conditions, improvements in the banking sector and macroeconomic conditions 
in Turkey as well as the conditions in the home countries of foreign banks affected 
foreign banks’ entry decisions. Global liquidity conditions helped foreign banks raise 
funds to penetrate into the Turkish market. Low returns in home countries made 
expansion an inevitable path to follow for international banks. The December 2004 
decision of the EU to start accession negotiations with Turkey contributed positively to 
foreign bank entries and the growth period. The declining inflation and public sector 
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borrowing requirement (PSBR) in Turkey brought the intermediation role of banks to 
the fore. It was not possible for foreign banks to benefit from the growing loan markets 
in Turkey through their small subsidiaries. Hence, they preferred to acquire existing 
banks to penetrate faster into the Turkish market. The regulations, supervision and the 
better fit to Basel-II guidelines also increased the confidence in the Turkish economy 
and provided more reliable means of assessment for foreign banks. So far, Turkey has 
benefited mainly from the capital inflows generated by these entries. The possible 
drawbacks of foreign bank entries are also discussed in this paper, though no significant 
negative impact has been observed yet. 
 
There are two main approaches to evaluate the efficiency of the banking sector. Some 
studies examine various ratios to assess efficiency while others utilize econometric 
models to construct more unified indices. The general picture indicates an increase in 
the efficiency performances of banks in the post-crisis period. Various indicators also 
reveal convergence between the efficiency levels of state and private banks in recent 
years.  
 
The outline of this study which attempts to delineate the evolution of the Turkish 
banking sector in the post-crisis era is as follows. The next section summarizes the 
events in the Turkish banking sector until the 2001 crisis. After that, a section focuses 
on the major regulatory changes. In the subsequent section, a detailed account of the 
consolidation and transformation of Turkish banks following the crisis is presented with 
reference to various structural indicators of the sector. Efficiency and foreign bank entry 
are examined in the last two sections.  
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2. Turkish Banking Sector Until 2001 
 
Until 1980s, Turkey was governed with planned development programs. The financial 
system virtually lacked securities markets and consisted mainly of commercial banks, 
with a predominance of public banks. Operating under the restrictions of a planned 
economy involving controlled interest rates, high reserve requirements, constraints on 
entry, and a limited range of products, banks were allocating almost three fourths of 
loanable funds as directed credit (Denizer 1999). The restrictions, in line with the 
government’s protectionist policies, prevented the formation of a competitive banking 
sector. 
 
Global paradigms and international institutions’ recommendations and impositions were 
profoundly influential in the development of the Turkish financial system in the last 
decades. In 1980s, the eminent impacts of neoliberalism were witnessed in the financial 
realm around the globe. Banking deregulations and capital account liberalizations, 
which were later pointed out as the major causes of the endemic crises in the 1990s, 
prevailed all over the world. It was rhetorically argued that banking deregulations would 
allow market forces to more efficiently shape the evolution of financial systems, and 
that capital account liberalizations would allow savings to flow from low to high return 
countries, fostering world-wide growth and the betterment of low-income countries 
(Tirole 2002). To control banks’ risk taking behaviour, prudential capital regulations 
were introduced in 1988 with Basel Capital Accord (Basel-I) in place of classical 
banking regulations on banks’ assets, activities, interest rates and the like. The Accord 
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required banks to hold equity of at least 8 per cent of their risk-weighted assets. The 
basic logic behind these regulations was quite simple: their increased stake in the 
business would make banks internalize risks. However, the enormous amounts of short 
term capital inflows and serious banking sector weaknesses in the form of high credit, 
interest rate, exchange rate and portfolio risks, observed as stylized facts prior to almost 
all crises in emerging countries in the 1990s, forcefully demonstrated that liberalizations 
did not attain the desired ends at least in the 1990s (Yildiran 2008). 
 
Turkey was also affected by these global developments. In early 1980s, as part of a 
broader liberalization process encompassing trade liberalization, some financial 
liberalization measures were introduced. Entry barriers were relaxed, loan and deposit 
rate controls were abolished and most of the directed credit requirements were removed 
so as to enhance competition and efficiency in the banking sector. However, the 
bankers’ crisis that occurred in this liberalized environment in years 1981-1982 revealed 
the necessity of a new regulatory framework. The IMF and the World Bank were 
actively involved in the development of this framework. In 1983, the Saving Deposit 
Insurance Fund (SDIF) was established. In 1985, a new banking law (Banks Act No. 
3182) was passed to lay down the institutional and legal foundations of prudential 
regulations. The law obliged banks to submit standardized accounting reports, 
participate in the SDIF and allocate provisions for non-performing loans. However, the 
law, which entrusted the responsibility of regulating and supervising banks to the 
Treasury, had two important shortcomings. Firstly, the regulatory institution was not 
independent of pressures from politicians and influential banking lobbies. Such 
pressures induced regulators to adopt a stance of inaction (regulatory forbearance) 
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restraining their timely intervention in ailing banks. Secondly, the primary objective of 
the regulatory institution (the Treasury), budgetary financing, was often conflicting with 
the responsibility of ensuring banks’ soundness. As banks greatly facilitated budgetary 
financing by holding large amounts of government securities, the Treasury tended to 
overlook the unacceptable credit, interest rate and exchange rate risks of banks. 
Likewise, when a bank was in need of urgent liquidity, the Treasury was likely to 
refrain from injecting that amount, as this action might disturb the budgetary 
equilibrium (Alper and Öniş 2004).  
 
Capital account liberalizations also took place in this decade. Households were allowed 
to hold foreign currency denominated deposits in 1984. The Central Bank established 
the Foreign Exchange and Banknotes Market in 1988. International capital flows were 
completely liberalized in 1989 along with the full convertibility of Turkish Lira. Other 
important developments of this decade were that the government securities market was 
established in 1985, the interbank money market became operational in 1986 and the 
Central Bank started open market operations in 1987. 
 
1990s is a highly mismanaged period in the Turkish economic history, by virtue of short 
term and populist policies. Vast increases in public sector expenditures led to very high 
PSBR, inflation and interest rates during this decade. Banks, instead of fulfilling their 
financial intermediation role, played a vital role in financing budget deficits by holding 
sizeable amounts of government securities in their asset portfolios. Governments, on the 
other hand, granted many new licenses mostly to politically connected groups to reduce 
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their borrowing costs, leading ultimately to an inefficient banking system with 
excessive numbers of banks, bank branches and employees.1 
 
High inflation rates were a major concern in this period; liberal foreign trade policies 
and a controlled exchange rate regime were the fashionable remedies proposed by 
international institutions. High PSBR and the resulting high interest rates, together with 
the government’s commitment to the controlled exchange rate regime, led to immense 
amounts of short-term capital inflows, mostly through international interbank lending 
(Uluceviz and Yildiran 2008). The syndicated loans borrowed by private banks were 
used, to a significant extent, to acquire government securities. The excessive level of 
exchange rate risk assumed by some of these banks was disregarded by the Treasury. 
When the government attempted to suppress interest rates while adhering to the 
controlled exchange rate regime (impossible trinity), capital outflow broke out in 1994. 
Devaluation ensued; several banks with high open positions fell insolvent and were 
taken over by SDIF. A full-blown panic was prevented by launching the 100 per cent 
deposit insurance scheme, albeit credit crunch and economic contraction could not be 
avoided. 
 
Following the crisis, with the stabilization program of the IMF, state economic 
enterprises and extra-budgetary-funds were reined in to enhance fiscal discipline and 
reduce budget deficits. However, these measures were not effective; governments had 
recourse to public banks to implement their rent-distributing policies. They employed 
Ziraat Bankası and Halkbank to extend subsidized credits to agricultural producers and 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). The significant amount of duty losses of 
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the public banks (close to USD 20 billion) stemming from these directed lending 
practices could not be backed immediately by the Treasury due to budgetary concerns. 
The public banks were then obliged to raise funds from the markets, resulting in, to the 
detriment of the whole banking sector, very high interest rates on deposits and interbank 
borrowing (Alper and Öniş 2004). The number of private banks increased during this 
period. Not only was deficit financing a profitable business but also the private sector’s 
access to funds was impaired due to the high PSBR. These provided motive to large 
industrial conglomerates for founding their own banks (Akçay 2001). Connected 
lending became prevalent. There was not sufficient regulation to put a check on this 
process, and political interference was abundant. As a result, the share of non-
performing loans increased sharply after 1997 (Özatay and Sak 2002). In 1999, upon 
rising concerns over severe deteriorations in the fiscal balance and banking sector 
soundness, the IMF was invoked to standby to avert an imminent crisis. 
 
Meanwhile, twin (currency-banking) crises prevailed all around the globe especially in 
the second half of 1990s. Neoliberal policies were deemed to be the underlying cause. It 
was envisioned that, with capital account and financial liberalizations, capital would be 
channeled toward investment opportunities in emerging countries. However the 
liberalizations led to severe banking sector weaknesses in these countries where 
institutional quality was not high. Serious doubts were cast on the adequacy of Basel-I 
in controlling banks' risk taking. The Accord was severely criticized for being too 
crude,2 not incentive compatible, unable to respond to developments in the markets and 
for leading to excessive short-term capital flows to developing countries. To respond to 
these criticisms, some amendments were proposed in the New Accord (Basel II) in 
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1999. Risk groups were refined to make the Accord more risk-sensitive and a menu of 
regulatory approaches (standardized, internal rating based, etc.) was offered to banks to 
achieve incentive compatibility. Moreover, to prevent excessive short-term capital flows 
to emerging countries, the risk weights of the loans to these countries were based on 
external rating agencies’ grades, and to enhance transparency and market discipline, 
disclosure requirements were imposed on banks.3  
 
Concurrently, the IMF was also exposed to severe criticisms, in general for offering the 
same set of policies to all countries, and in particular for not being able to diagnose the 
symptoms leading to the Asian Crisis of 1997, in which banking sector problems had 
played a major role (Öniş and Aysan 2000). The IMF, having identified financial sector 
vulnerabilities as a key component of the Asian Crisis of 1997, started laying a strong 
emphasis on structural reforms in the financial sector in its programs after this 
catastrophe. In May 1999, the IMF and the World Bank jointly launched the Financial 
Sector Assessment Program to remedy the prevalent banking sector deficiencies 
observed in member countries. These institutions' recognition of the importance of 
financial sector regulations were hence reflected in the IMF-supported programs carried 
out in Turkey. The commitment to the regulation of financial markets and the 
strengthening of banks is visible in the Letters of Intent to the IMF in the period after 
the Asian Crisis4. Also apparent in these letters is the consequence given to the 
independence of the Central Bank. The 2000-2001 financial crises in Turkey, however, 
supplied the more suitable environment to implement reforms in these directions. 
. 
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Under these global circumstances, an IMF-supported program was introduced at the end 
of 1999 in order to curb inflation via an exchange rate anchor in Turkey. With the IMF 
program a new banking law was enacted (Banks Act No. 4389). To remove the 
fundamental shortcomings of the previous law, an independent institution, the BRSA, 
was established in 1999 under the strict guidelines of the Financial Sector Assessment 
Program of the IMF and the World Bank (Al and Aysan 2006). Rendering the BRSA 
immune from the direct influences of politicians and banking lobbies, and assigning to 
it the single straightforward objective of ensuring the soundness of the banking sector 
were the major improvements. Within this framework, the BRSA was also given the 
exclusive right to grant banking licenses and to run the SDIF, the institution authorized 
to take over and restructure insolvent banks. Furthermore, the former distinction 
between public and private banks was abolished, and they were subjected to the same 
set of rules and regulations.  
 
The BRSA could only be fully operational towards the end of 2000, and the Treasury 
was the reigning regulatory institution in the meantime. In this period, the banking 
sector was afflicted with extremely perverse structural problems, including the 
dominance of public banks and their huge duty losses, a small and fragmented banking 
sector, low asset quality, connected lending practices, an inadequate capital base, 
extreme exposure to market risk, inadequate internal control and risk management 
systems, poor corporate governance and lack of transparency (BRSA 2001).5 All these 
deficiencies together with severe fiscal weaknesses were the factors that paved the way 
to the 2000-2001 crises. Besides, the insistence of the IMF on the controlled exchange 
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rate regime in the presence of significant macroeconomic imbalances needs be added to 
the above list of factors (Özatay and Sak 2002). 
 
The crisis story was similar to its antecedent in 1994, except for the close surveillance 
of the IMF throughout the process. High PSBR and the commitment to the exchange 
rate regime led to short-term capital inflows. Private banks acquired large portfolios of 
government securities, financed by either foreign currency denominated loans or 
overnight repo transactions. The resulting extreme vulnerability of private banks to 
market risks was overlooked by the Treasury. The crisis started with the failure of 
Demirbank, which had aggressively invested in government securities and financed 
them in the overnight repo market. With the rising interest rates, the bank ran into 
liquidity problems. As the required liquidity could be obtained from neither the Central 
Bank nor the interbank market, Demirbank fell insolvent and was taken over by SDIF in 
December 2000. The duty losses of public banks augmented the concerns over the 
economy, and a full-scale currency attack started in early 2001, leading to the collapse 
of the exchange rate program. An abysmal depreciation of the currency ensued, 
resulting in the most severe financial crisis Turkey had ever experienced.6  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
This calamity, however, yielded two important positive results. Firstly, the banking 
sector has become much sounder and leaner thanks to the lessons taken from the crisis. 
Secondly, regulators emerged quite powerful from the crisis, enabling them to 
implement regulatory reforms while domestic coalitions against reforms in the banking 
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sector were dissolved. The regulatory framework could be almost fully aligned with 
international standards starting with the May 2001 Banking Sector Restructuring 
Program executed by the BRSA in consultation with the IMF and the World Bank 
(Steinherr et al. 2004).  A floating exchange rate regime, fiscal discipline and an 
independent central bank that will endeavor for price stability were the other covenants 
placed by these institutions in the wake of the crisis.  
 
The most important factor that brought the Turkish banking sector from its miserable 
state after the 2001 crisis to its current well-capitalized, highly-liquid state with high 
asset quality and low exposure to market risks is the regulatory reforms that have been 
carried out since 1999. However, at least two other important factors should be 
mentioned as well. One is the macroeconomic stability and the unprecedented fiscal 
performance achieved in the post-crisis period. The other is the unusually favorable 
global liquidity conditions that were conducive to 26 consecutive quarters of 
uninterrupted growth.  
 
3. Major Regulatory Changes in the Banking Sector 
 
The regulatory reforms, initiated with the Banking Sector Restructuring Program in 
2001 and continuously supplemented ever since, had four important objectives. The first 
was to restructure and rehabilitate the state banks financially, with the ultimate goal of 
privatizing them. Some measures taken towards this end were the elimination of duty 
losses and overnight liabilities, these banks’ recapitalization, determination of deposit 
rates in congruity with the market and other efficiency-related operational restructuring 
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plans. Another aim of the program was to resolve the situation of the banks under the 
administration of the SDIF through sale, merger, liquidation or transfer. By the end of 
2002, only two banks remained under the management of the SDIF out of the 20 
brought under its control from 1997 to 2002 (Table 3). The third major purpose set by 
the BRSA was the strengthening of private banks. Based on dialogues with individual 
banks, the BRSA obtained letters of commitment from them concerning their 
restructuring strategies and followed up on their execution, intervening with those 
which were not able to come up with acceptable plans or to implement their plans. The 
last objective was to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory framework. The major 
regulatory attempts, which have been supported and/or sponsored by the IMF and aimed 
at aligning the regulatory and supervisory framework with the international standards 
set forth by Basel-II, can be categorized under the following headings:7 
 
• Non-Performing Loans (NPL): The BRSA developed two legal frameworks to 
address the NPL of the banking sector. The establishment of asset management 
corporations was allowed. The platform, named the Istanbul Approach, gathered 
banks and firms to sign a treaty according to which nonperforming corporate 
loans would be restructured and banks would be allowed to remove these NPL 
from their balance sheets. 
• Bank Ownership: Adopting “fit and proper” criteria, rules for bank ownership 
were strengthened. Also, to enforce accountability, personal liability was 
brought to the members of the board of directors and managers whose decisions 
and actions caused the failure of the bank. 
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• Capital Adequacy: Capital adequacy ratio was set as 8 per cent in accordance 
with international standards, and its calculation was expanded to incorporate 
market risks, operational risks and off-balance sheet risks. 
• Connected Lending and Participations: Risk groups were introduced and 
credits to banks’ shareholders and subsidiaries were defined as belonging to the 
same risk group. The limit of a bank’s exposure to a risk group was reduced 
from 75 per cent to 25 per cent of its net worth. Moreover, banks’ non-financial 
subsidiaries were prohibited from exceeding 15 per cent of total net worth each, 
with the total such subsidiary share in net worth being bound by 60 per cent. 
• Foreign Exchange (FX) Exposure: Banks were not allowed to take FX 
positions exceeding 20 per cent of their equity, and they were enabled to reduce 
their exposures through domestic debt swap auctions. 
• Loan Loss Reserves and Provisions: Loans were classified into five categories: 
standard, watch list, limited collection possibility, doubtful collection possibility 
and write-off. Any nonpayment of principal or interest on due date or a 
deterioration of collateral quality causes the loan to be removed from the 
standard category. If nonpayment exceeds 180 days, the loan is progressively 
classified into the last three categories, which are regarded as nonperforming and 
require provisioning. Provisioning starts at 20 per cent and reaches 100 per cent 
for loans with a nonpayment period of one year. If a loan is classified as 
nonperforming, all loans of the same borrower are considered nonperforming. 
This regulation gives banks incentives for diversification and disincentives for 
connected lending. 
 18
• Deposit Insurance and the SDIF: To reduce moral hazard and enhance market 
discipline, a limited deposit guarantee scheme was introduced in place of the 
previous 100 per cent blanket guarantee. According to the new scheme, 
institutional depositors were taken out of the deposit insurance scope, and a limit 
of YTL 50 000 (approximately € 37 500) was placed on the individual 
depositors’ protection scheme. Deposit insurance premiums were reduced and 
made risk-based. Administrations of the SDIF and BRSA were separated in 
2004. 
• Supervision: In addition to the on-site examinations of the BRSA through the 
Board of Sworn Bank Auditors, external and internal audit requirements were 
imposed on banks. External auditors are required to examine banks’ financial 
statements according to the internationally accepted accounting principles and 
banks’ own auditors are required to regularly submit reports on their banks’ 
financial stance. The BRSA has particularly tightened the controls following the 
Imarbank case in 20038 
• Others: Internal risk monitoring standards were set. Consolidated reporting was 
required to incorporate the accounts of the off-shore subsidiaries of domestic 
banks. The Central Bank reduced the reserve and liquidity requirements by a 
total of two points as well as starting interest payments on FX denominated 
required reserves in order to enhance financial intermediation and provide 
flexibility in liquidity management. Regulations were brought on many issues 
including starting a bank, the opening of branches in Turkey and abroad, capital 
expansion, and acquisition and transfer of shares. Mergers and acquisitions were 
encouraged through tax incentives.  
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4. Recovery, Stabilization and Growth of the Banking Sector  
 
The progress in the Turkish banking sector after the 2001 crisis can be categorized into 
two periods. The first spans the period up to 2004. This period can be called the 
recovery and stabilization period. The second is the growth period of the banking 
sector. In the early years of the recovery and stabilization period, there was an intense 
restructuring in the banking sector as the unsuccessful banks were taken over by the 
SDIF and some banks engaged in mergers and acquisitions (Table 2). In order to 
restructure state banks, USD 21.9 billion was spent on duty losses and recapitalization. 
The total transfer to the banks under the SDIF reached USD 21.8 billion. The cost of 
restructuring and recapitalization of public banks, banks taken over by the SDIF and 
other private banks amounted to USD 53.2 billion, which was 35.9 per cent of GNP in 
2001 (Steinherr et al. 2004). 
 
The recovery and stabilization period up to 2004 resulted in declines in the numbers of 
banks, branches and employees for the banking sector (Table 3). The numbers of 
branches and employees had dropped to 6,078 and 124,030 respectively by the end of 
2003. Some of these branches had been opened towards the end of 1990s to be able to 
collect more deposits and buy high-yield government bonds. Certainly, some of them 
became inefficient in an environment of declining interest rates. The number of banks 
declined to 55 in 2003 from 85 in 2000. The general elections of November 2002 
brought a single party government to power after a long period of coalition 
governments. In December 2002, the Copenhagen Summit fostered the support for 
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Turkey for the full membership negotiations with European Union (EU). The single 
party government continued the reforms and the restructuring program in the banking 
sector initiated by the former government after the 2001 crisis. These developments 
contributed to the favorable environment for the restructuring of the banking sector.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
The Turkish banking sector entered a new phase which can be called the growth period 
in 2004. The Turkish economy grew by 9.3 per cent while the world economy reached a 
5.1 per cent growth rate in this year. In December 2004, Turkey and EU agreed to start 
accession negotiations in September 2005. The assets to GDP ratio of Turkish banks 
rose by 11.7 per cent in 2005 (Figure 1). The number of bank branches increased by 2.3 
per cent and reached 6,219 while the number of employees increased by 3.2 per cent 
and reached 127,944 in 2004. The number of banks has stabilized after 2005 at 50. The 
asset share of public banks declined from 38.2 per cent in 2004 to 25.4 in 2008 (Table 
4). The number of branches increased by 5.1 per cent and reached 6,537, while the 
number of employees rose by 8.4 per cent and reached 138,724. After 2005, the 
numbers of branches and employees have continued to increase steadily. However, the 
most notable change in 2005 was the sudden increase in foreign bank entry. There were 
five major cases of foreign bank entry in 2005 and this trend has continued until June 
2007 where the global liquidity conditions started to deter further entries. Some foreign 
banks like Fortis and Dexia acquired the majority shares of certain Turkish banks while 
others like GE Consumer Finance and Citigroup bought sizeable minority shares. The 
aggregate asset share of foreigners reached 41.5 per cent in July 2008 (Table 9). By 
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2005, international investors had more confidence in the Turkish banking sector. For 
example, banks in Turkey succeeded in raising securitization and syndication loans by 
more than 50 per cent in 2005, reaching USD 15.1 billion. This rising trend continued 
both in 2006 and 2007.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
The global financial crisis and tighter liquidity conditions appear to have put a halt to 
the growth period of the banking sector in Turkey. However, the banking sector in 
Turkey is likely to resume its growth performance once the global liquidity conditions 
get better. The basis for this conclusion becomes more apparent when we compare 
Turkey with some of the Eastern European countries. With respect to asset size to GDP 
ratio, the banking sector in Turkey ranks at the bottom after Romania (Table 5). Turkey 
has much lower ratios compared to the EU averages in terms of loans/GDP, 
deposit/GDP and loans/deposits. Hence, the banking sector in Turkey also has a great 
potential in terms of asset, loan and deposit growth. Remarkably low household 
indebtedness in Turkey compared with the EU countries reinforces the above 
conclusion (Table 6).  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
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As for indicators of competition, the concentration ratios of the Turkish banking sector 
increased during the restructuring and consolidation period. The asset shares of the first 
five and ten banks in 2002 increased from 57.4 and 79.3 per cent to 58.1 and 82.0 per 
cent in 2004 (Table 7). The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) index also increased 
from 851.7 in 2002 to 905.9 in 2004 (Abbasoglu et al. 2007). During the growth period, 
there was a slight decline in all the concentration ratios indicating the rising competition 
in the sector in 2006. When the concentration ratios of the Turkish banking sector are 
compared to the EU, Turkey is rather close to the EU averages. 2007 figures, for 
example, show that the asset shares of the first five banks constitute 60 per cent of the 
banking assets in Turkey. The same ratio is 59 per cent for the EU-27 and 55 for the 
Euro Zone (Table 5). The first five banks of the banking sector in terms of asset size 
have remained almost unaltered since 2002. Hence, the consolidation and restructuring 
attempts after the 2001 crisis did not result in major changes in the concentration of 
banking assets.  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 
 
The total assets of the Turkish banking sector have shown a steady upward trend since 
2002, exceeding YTL 650 billion by the end of the second quarter in 2008 (Figure 1). 
The total share of banking assets in GDP has been increasing since 2004, having 
reached 71.5 per cent by June 2008. The corresponding 2007 percentages were 334.09 
for EU-27, 108.9 for Bulgaria and 76.79 for Poland.  
 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1  
 23
 
The breakdown of assets and liabilities can be examined to observe financial deepening 
and the increasing intermediation activities of banks in Turkey. Loans have been taking 
up a growing share of bank assets as well as of GDP since 2003 (Table 8). Deposits 
constitute the largest part of funds and appear as a stable percentage of liabilities 
throughout the last five years (Figure 2). The share of deposits in GDP has been 
increasing since 2004. The ratio of loans to deposits has increased from 49 per cent in 
2003 to 87 per cent in June 2008, exhibiting considerable improvement. 
 
All types of loans have displayed an increasing trend in the growth period. However, 
the growth rates in retail lending, comprising consumer and credit card loans, have been 
higher than in corporate lending mostly due to the rises in housing and personal finance 
credits. In an increasingly stable environment, banks have preferred to focus on the 
highly profitable retail banking. When the extremely low household indebtedness in 
Turkey is taken into account, these high growth rates are not surprising (Table 6). In 
November 2008, retail credits and credits to SME’s constituted about 32 and 24 per cent 
of total loans, respectively. Large enterprises, on the other hand, borrowed not only 
from Turkish banks but also from international financial markets at more suitable 
conditions. The risks associated with international borrowing are now borne by the 
corporate sector and not by banks like in 1990s. The recent high growth rates in retail 
loans may raise the concern that consumer credits are crowding out investment credits. 
However, in an open economy context, both consumption and investment in Turkey 
have been concurrently financed by capital inflows.  
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INSERT TABLE 8 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2  
 
  
Turkish banks are much more profitable than the banks in many European countries. 
Only some Eastern European countries like Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, and Bulgaria 
ranked above the banks in Turkey in terms of Return on Equity (ROE) in 2007 (Figure 
3). With respect to Return on Assets (ROA), on the other hand,  banks in Turkey have 
higher average ratios than the ratios of these Eastern European countries. During the 
growth period, ROE reached 19.2 per cent in 2006 from 10.9 per cent in 2005. In 2007 
and in the first quarter of 2008 ROE continued to increase and reached 21.8 and 21.9 
per cent, respectively. Considering the high returns on the Turkish government bonds, it 
is not surprising to observe these high ROE and ROA ratios. However, international 
comparisons show that with respect to either standard the banking sector profitability 
indicators are rather high in Turkey. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3  
 
By March 2008, 40 out of 50 banks were profitable. This number indicates a decline in 
the number of profitable banks since 46 banks were profitable at the end of 2007. 
However, the assets of the profitable banks in total assets of the banking sector in 
Turkey have not changed much and stood around 99 per cent since 2006. Only some 
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small banks were not profitable in recent years. Moreover, 22 banks had ROE over 15 
per cent in 2007. The assets of these 22 banks corresponded to 92.6 per cent of the total 
assets in banking, indicating high ROE for the major players in the market.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 4  
 
The banking sector reached higher levels of profitability especially in the growth period 
after 2005 (Figure 4). The profitability indicators can be quite volatile depending on the 
aggregate macroeconomic and bank specific conditions. However, it is safe to state that 
the banking sector attained a much stable path of profitability growth during the post-
crisis period. The effects of the global liquidity crisis on the banking sector are likely to 
be seen in the upcoming years. If the banking sector passes this period without major 
damage, it will remain to be attractive for international investors.  
 
CAR has been steadily declining in recent years in spite of the growth in total equity. 
There are two major reasons for this decline. First, the banks have lately increased their 
risk weighted assets by switching from government securities to loans in their asset 
portfolios. This shift has required banks to hold more capital since the risk weight for 
government securities is zero. Secondly, the regulators were cautious about global 
developments and the rapid surge in credits in Turkey, and took some precautions. The 
BRSA, for example, increased the risk weights for letters of guarantees and letters of 
credit by new amendments in the legislation. Another example is related to the credit 
card market. The required capital for the installment credit card receivables was 
increased with an amendment.  
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INSERT FIGURE 5  
 
CAR was 23.7 and 22.3 per cent in 2005 and 2006, respectively. It dropped to 18.9 per 
cent in 2007 and to 17.2 per cent in the first quarter of 2008 (Figure 5). In 2007, the 
radical decline in the CAR by 1.4 percentage points essentially stemmed from the 
requirement for the banks to hold additional capital to cover their operational risks 
beginning from June 2007. As compared to the 2001 crisis, the banks in Turkey appear 
to be much sounder in the face of the global crisis. Despite the declines in recent years, 
the CAR of the sector remained much higher than both the minimum requirement of 8 
per cent and the target ratio of 12 per cent. As of March 2008, the CAR of 32 banks 
representing 52.2 per cent of the sector’s assets was over 15 per cent. With these ratios, 
Turkish banks stand among the highly capitalized banks throughout the world (Figure 
6).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 6  
 
5. Assessment of Efficiency Improvement  
 
There are two main approaches to evaluate efficiency in banking. One approach is to 
analyze certain illustrative indicators of efficiency, which are mostly the ratios related to 
the profitability of banks. For example, Steinherr et al. (2004) utilize deposits/assets, 
deposits/branches, deposits/employees, employees/branches and assets/employees ratios 
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among such indicators. Certainly, Turkish banks performed much better after the crisis 
in terms of these indicators of efficiency. However, there is no common set of indicators 
to assess efficiency of banking. For example, some studies measure efficiency in terms 
of personnel expenses, commission revenues and net interest income as percentages of 
total operating expenses and total income. The personnel expenses/total operating 
expenses after the crisis suddenly shrank due to the declining number of employees, 
remained around 30 per cent between 2002 and 2004, and jumped to 37.2 per cent 
during the growth period in 2004-2007 due to the expansion in employment (BRSA 
2007). Solely based on this measure, it can be wrongly concluded that the efficiency of 
banks gets worse after 2005. It is possible to draw similar faulty results from other 
indicators as well. For example, commission revenues/total operating expenses used to 
be 28.1 per cent in 2002. This ratio increased steadily in the growth period and reached 
48.2 per cent in 2007. The rapid increase in this ratio is the result of another structural 
change in the banking sector after the crisis. Throughout 1990s, banks used to subsidize 
commission-generating services. Their interest incomes were so high that banks 
lowered fees and commissions to attract more deposits. However, due to the declining 
interest rates and increasing competition, the net interest income as percentage of total 
income has declined in the post-crisis period.  
 
Although these illustrative indicators of efficiency may shed light on certain aspects of 
banking, they are often criticized on several grounds. This ratio analysis is often related 
to profitability measures. However, Abbasoğlu et al. (2007) show that certain efficiency 
measures do not have a statistically robust relationship with profitability indicators. 
Moreover, it is often difficult to deduce general conclusions based on multiple 
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indicators of efficiency. Hence, the second approach produces a single index of 
efficiency by incorporating various measures of efficiency ratios. There are parametric 
and nonparametric estimations of efficiency scores. For example, Aysan and Ceyhan 
(2008a) calculate efficiency scores based on nonparametric estimations. They show that 
the efficiency scores of banks in Turkey rose in the post-crisis period. Also, their results 
reveal a convergence in the efficiency scores of private, state and foreign banks in the 
growth period. These results are confirmed by Steinherr et al. (2004). Aysan et al. 
(2009), on the other hand, generate the cost and profit efficiency scores using a panel 
stochastic frontier approach. Their estimation shows that cost efficiency scores steadily 
improve in the post-crisis period. However, profit efficiency scores increase initially in 
the post-crisis period, and deteriorate later during the growth period due to increasing 
competition and declining interest rates. The general conclusion from various measures 
of efficiency in the literature indicates that the banking sector has improved its 
efficiency during the post-crisis period and that there is a convergence in efficiency 
performances of different groups of banks in the second half of the 2000s. 
 
6. Foreign Bank Entry in the Growth Period 
  
By the end of 2000, based on their share in paid-in capital, foreign banks’ share in the 
assets of the Turkish banking sector was 2.8 per cent (BRSA 2001). By July 2008, this 
ratio increased almost ten times and reached 24.3 per cent. International investors also 
acquired publicly traded shares corresponding to 17.1 per cent of the total assets. Hence 
the aggregate share of international investors in the Turkish banking sector was 41.5 per 
cent in July 2008. This radical change in the ownership structure is actually rather 
 29
recent. In the recovery and stabilization period, foreign bank entry into the banking 
sector was negligible. Only HSBC took over Demirbank from the SDIF in 2002. 
Domestic banks became substantially undervalued after the 2001 crisis. Besides, the 
banks under the control of SDIF were ready to be sold to international investors. 
However, these were not sufficient to entice foreign banks into investing in the Turkish 
banking sector.  
 
The sudden surge in foreign bank entry into Turkey started with the growth period. 
BNP Paribas launched the route with its acquisition of Türkiye Ekonomi Bankasi in 
February 2005. Four other major deals in 2005 were followed by seven acquisitions in 
2006. The final deal was the acquisition of Oyakbank by ING Bank in June 2007.  
 
Factors affecting foreign bank entry decisions during the growth period can be 
categorized as global, domestic and home country related. Global liquidity conditions 
facilitated international banks’ penetration into developing countries. With their high 
credibility, they could easily raise funds in global markets to finance their acquisitions 
all over the world. The assets of international banks in developing countries increased 
almost three times its level in 2000 and reached USD 3 trillion in 2007 (World Bank 
2008). Certainly, global liquidity conditions cannot per se explain the foreign 
acquisitions in Turkey. Under these favorable global liquidity conditions, which started 
around 2002, international banks initially preferred to expand into Eastern European 
countries rather than Turkey, reinforcing the argument that domestic conditions are at 
least as critical in this process.   
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INSERT TABLE 9 
 
The regulatory and supervisory reforms, the consolidation and restructuring in the 
sector, the commitment of the single party government to the reform process, the 
macroeconomic stability achieved by the successful monetary and fiscal policies, and 
the EU anchor strengthened at the beginning of 2005 altogether changed the perceptions 
about Turkey and contributed significantly to the foreign banks’ entry decisions into 
Turkey. Another noteworthy factor was that the risk-averse owners of domestic banks 
were quite eager to sell their shares to international investors and exit from the banking 
business after the change in the regulation that held faulty bank owners personally liable 
for the losses of their banks. 
 
Regarding the home country reasons, lower returns to banking in developed countries 
due to deeper financial markets and higher competition have provided the banks in these 
countries with strong incentives to expand into developing countries where returns are 
higher. Furthermore, scale economies in banking business due to heavy investments in 
technological infrastructures reinforce these incentives for expansion. Turkey, in this 
respect, stands as a country of substantial potential with its sizable and young 
population, extremely low household indebtedness and relatively undersized banking 
sector in terms of the total bank assets to GDP ratio (Table 6).  
 
 Almost all foreign banks preferred to expand in Turkey through acquisitions rather than 
establishing their own banks as a green-field investment. There are definitely some 
regulatory barriers to opening new banks in Turkey. BRSA appears to be reluctant to 
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issue new licenses. Moreover, it is quite difficult for a newly established foreign bank to 
obtain a significant market share in the Turkish banking sector. Hence, acquiring a 
domestic bank is an easier and faster route to penetrate in Turkey. As a matter of fact, 
foreign banks purchased the domestic banks at a premium to be able to capture market 
shares quickly and easily in this promising marketplace.  
 
A number of foreign banks were operational in the Turkish financial markets through 
their branches and subsidiaries in 1990s. Their main activity was to buy high return 
government securities or lend domestic banks in the interbank market. However, as 
PSBR has declined since the 2001 crisis and the core function of banks, intermediation, 
has come to the fore, banks have started to explore the profit opportunities from 
corporate and retail lending. Hence, in addition to government bonds and interbank 
lending, foreign banks felt the mounting need of expanding their operations into these 
lucrative markets. Furthermore, some banks like NBG and EFG Eurobank have 
expressed their intentions to spread their investments to sectors other than banking as 
well.  
  
Increasing foreign bank entry in recent years has generated arguments to limit foreign 
banks’ presence in Turkey. In terms of majority shares, the foreign ownership in the 
Turkish banking sector is above the Euro Zone average of 19.5 per cent and, below the 
EU-27 average of 28.7 per cent. In Eastern Europe, however, these ratios are much 
higher, like 81.6 per cent in Bulgaria, 70.5 per cent in Poland and 57.4 per cent in 
Hungary (Table 10). Upon the experiences of Eastern European countries, one may 
think that once global financial conditions ameliorate, foreign bank ownership in 
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Turkey will continue to rise. However, Eastern European countries are rather unique in 
this respect. These countries received foreign bank entries when their banking systems 
were completely dysfunctional following the collapse of their former regimes, hence 
foreign banks were easily able to penetrate in these markets. However, banks in Turkey 
are much more experienced and sophisticated, implying that foreign bank entries are not 
likely to reach the levels in Eastern European countries in the near future (Steinherr et 
al. 2004).  
 
  INSERT TABLE 10 
 
As the major foreign bank entries have occurred from 2005 on, it is still too early to 
fully assess their costs and benefits to Turkey. As an immediate benefit, they created 
considerable amounts of FDI inflows in the last three years. Actually, much more is 
expected from foreign banks (Aysan and Ceyhan 2008b). Since they have better access 
to international capital markets, they are expected to regularly bring capital at more 
suitable conditions: in larger quantities, with longer maturity and at lower costs. 
However, due to deteriorating global liquidity conditions, those expected capital inflows 
have not yet started. Such benefits of regular and favorable capital inflows are likely to 
be received during more stable periods in the coming years.  
 
Foreign banks are expected to bring better technologies and thereby increase the 
efficiency of the sector. These expectations are not really verified. Aysan and Ceyhan 
(2007) report that the technologies of domestic banks are not necessarily less advanced 
than their foreign counterparts. In certain IT products, domestic banks are even claimed 
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to be superior. Moreover, some foreign banks like Fortis and NBG consider relocating 
some of their IT businesses in other countries to Turkey. Aysan and Ceyhan (2008c) 
also show that there are no statically significant efficiency differences between similar 
types of domestic and foreign banks.  
 
As for the costs of foreign bank entries, the ongoing global credit crisis and the resulting 
financial problems in the home countries of some foreign banks (like Fortis and Dexia) 
intensified the concerns about capital flight by such foreign banks, though this 
possibility was considered to be a rather remote brainstorming exercise in 2005. With 
such fears, some depositors have already shifted their deposits from foreign to domestic 
banks.9 Another concern is about the possibility that foreign banks may leave Turkey 
and put the Turkish financial system into jeopardy due to their problems in other parts 
of world. No such capital flight scenarios have realized yet.  
 
It is argued that foreign bank entries have the potential to adversely affect competition. 
Since foreign banks have certain cost advantages in raising capital, they are expected to 
increase their market shares at the expense of domestic banks and acquire market power 
in financial markets. It is also argued that foreign banks may refrain from extending 
loans to SMEs and certain strategic sectors. As of now, the competition in the banking 
sector does not appear to be altered much. Measures like the concentration ratios of the 
first 5 banks or the HHI index demonstrate that there is only a slight increase in 
competition after 2005. Moreover, foreign banks do not seem to be specifically focusing 
on large corporations. On the contrary, they express their intentions to grow in high 
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return businesses like SME financing. In general, foreign banks do not appear to be 
diverging from their domestic counterparts.  
 
There is another concern about foreign banks which has not been discussed much in the 
literature. Turkish banks have been operating in Eastern European, Balkan and Central 
Asian countries through their branches and subsidiaries. It is argued that when domestic 
banks are sold with short term motives and at high prices, some long-term strategic 
advantages are lost, making it more difficult for Turkish banks and firms to operate and 
spread in those countries. Overall, time will better reveal whether the benefits of foreign 
bank entries in Turkey will prevail over the costs.  
 
7. Conclusion  
  
This paper has examined the unexplored restructuring and transformation experiences of 
the Turkish banking sector up to 2008. After briefly explaining the major characteristics 
of the banking sector until the 2001 crisis, the outbreak of the crisis and the regulatory 
measures in aftermath to strengthen banks are discussed. Regulators emerged rather 
powerful after the severe crisis to implement regulatory reforms while domestic 
coalitions against reforms in the banking sector were dissolved. The regulations mainly 
aimed at restructuring state banks, resolving the situation of the unhealthy banks under 
the SDIF, strengthening private banks and providing a better framework to regulate 
banks. To this end, many measures to limit various types of risks were institutionalized 
in the later years of the post-crisis period. Due to the lessons derived from crises, the 
regulators took a more proactive stance. Basel-II provided an important benchmark for 
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them to follow. Furthermore, certain proactive measures in recent years made the 
banking sector more prepared for the global shocks. 
  
This paper has classified the post-crises era into two sub-periods. The first period comes 
up to 2004 and is named as the recovery and stabilization period of the banking sector 
in Turkey. The major characteristics of this period were the restructuring of the banking 
sector through regulations, the consolidation of the asset structure and reductions in the 
numbers of banks, employees, and branches. The sector started growing in 2004, 
marking the growth period. The numbers of bank branches and employees started to 
increase along with a rapid increase in the assets of the banking sector. The growth 
period has also coincided with the favorable global liquidity conditions in international 
financial markets and improved macroeconomic conditions at home. Declining inflation 
rates and fiscal prudence helped banks assume their intermediation role, transferring the 
weights in their portfolios from government securities to loans. The December 2004 
decision of the EU to start accession negotiations with Turkey was another important 
milestone in the growth period as a result of which the confidence in the Turkish 
economy and especially in the banking sector has been strengthened. 
 
Another important feature of the growth period was the significant foreign bank entry. 
Just in a couple of years, the asset shares of foreign banks increased substantially. The 
reasons for these foreign bank entries are classified into three groups as related to 
global, domestic and home country conditions. After covering these reasons, the paper 
has gone on to examine the costs and benefits of these entries. So far, Turkey has 
mainly benefited from the immediate capital inflows generated by foreign bank entries. 
 36
However, possible capital outflows and the loss of competitiveness of Turkish banks in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia are potential drawbacks. 
 
This paper has also investigated various widely used indicators of banking sector 
efficiency to uncover the structural change experienced in the sector during the post-
crisis era. Efficiency indicators, both ratios and econometric indices, suggest that banks 
in general have reached higher levels of efficiency in this period. Furthermore, due to 
the regulations adopted, there appears to be a convergence in the efficiency 
performances of various types of banks. With respect to the profitability indicators, the 
banks reached higher profitability ratios after 2005. International comparisons reveal 
that ROE and ROA measures of profitability are rather high in Turkey, partly 
explaining the mounting interest of international investors in Turkish banks. 
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Figure 1: Total assets in the Turkish banking sector 
 
 
Source: CBRT Financial Stability Report, November 2008; BRSA. 
 
Figure 2: Asset and liability structure of the Turkish banking sector in percentages 
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Source: CBRT and BRSA. 
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Figure 3: Returns on equity and assets in 2007 
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Source: CBRT Financial Stability Report, May 2008. 
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Figure 4: Net profit indicators 
 
 
Source: CBRT Financial Stability Report, May 2008. 
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Figure 5: Capital adequacy ratio in Turkish banks 
 
 
Source: CBRT Financial Stability Report, May 2008.  
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Figure 6: CAR by selected EU and candidate countries 
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Source: CBRT Financial Stability Report, November 2008. 
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Figure 7: CAR by selected EU and candidate countries 
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Source: CBRT Financial Stability Report, November 2008. 
 
Table 1: Composition of balance sheet of the Turkish financial sector in 06/2008 
 Ratio
Banks 88.0
Securities Mutual Funds 3.3
Insurance Companies 3.1
Leasing Companies 2.0
Factoring Companies 1.2
Pension Funds 0.7
Consumer Finance Companies 0.6
Intermediary Institutions 0.5
Real Estate Investment Funds  0.5
Securities Investment Funds 0.1
 100.0
 
Source: CBRT Financial Stability Report, May 2008. 
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Table 2: Banks taken over by the SDIF 1998-2003 
 
Bank Takeover date Status Resolution date 
Bank Expres  Dec 12, 1998 Sold to Tekfenbank Jun 30, 2001 
Interbank  Jan 7, 1999 Merged with Etibank Jun 15, 2001 
Esbank  Dec 21, 1999 Merged with Etibank Jun 15, 2001 
Egebank Dec 21, 1999 Merged with Sümerbank Jan 26, 2001 
Yurtbank  Dec 21, 1999 Merged with Sümerbank Jan 26, 2001 
Yaşarbank Dec 21, 1999 Merged with Sümerbank Jan 26, 2001 
Sümerbank Dec 21, 1999 Transferred to Oyakbank Jan 11, 2002 
Etibank Oct 27, 2000 Merged with Bayındırbank Apr 4, 2002 
Bank Kapital Oct 27, 2000 Merged with Sümerbank Jan 26, 2001 
Demirbank Dec 6, 2000 Shares transferred to HSBC Oct 30, 2001 
Ulusalbank Feb 28, 2001 Merged with Sümerbank Apr 17, 2001 
Iktisat Bankasi  Mar 15, 2001 Merged with Bayındırbank Apr 4, 2002 
Sitebank  Jul 9, 2001 Shares transferred to Novabank Jan 25, 2002 
Bayindirbank Jul 9, 2001 Restructured as "Birleşik Fon Bankası" under SDIF Dec 7, 2005 
Kentbank  Jul 9, 2001 Merged with Bayındırbank Apr 4, 2002 
EGS Bank Jul 9, 2001 Merged with Bayındırbank Jan 18, 2002 
Tarişbank Jul 9, 2001 Shares transferred to Denizbank Dec 27, 2002 
Toprakbank Nov 30, 2001 Merged with Bayındırbank Sep 30, 2002 
Pamukbank Jun 19, 2002 Transferred to Halkbank Nov 12, 2004 
Imarbank  Jul 3, 2003 Decision to liquidate taken Continuing 
 
Source: SDIF 
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Table 3: Structural indicators of the banking sector 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 06/2008 
Number 
of banks 85 67 59 55 53 51 50 50 50 
Public 
deposit banks 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Private 
deposit banks 28 22 20 18 18 17 14 12 11 
Banks under 
the SDIF 11 6 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Foreign 
deposit banks 18 15 15 13 13 13 15 17 18 
Development and 
investment banks 18 15 14 14 13 13 13 13 13 
Participation 
banks 6 6 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 
Number of 
branches   6,351 6,078 6,219 6,537 7,296 8,117 8,722 
Deposit 
banks   6,169 6,046 6,186 6,220 6898 7,653 8,203 
Development and 
investment banks   34 32 33 25 42 42 48 
Participation 
Banks   148   292 356 422 471 
Number of 
employees   126,539 124,030 127,944 138,724 150,793 167,760 177,175 
Deposit 
banks   118,321 118,603 122,592 127,851 138,426 153,212 161,483 
Development and 
investment banks   5,688 5,427 5,352 5,126 5,255 5,361 5,378 
Participation 
banks   2,530   5,747 7,112 9,187 10,314 
 
Source: BRSA Financial Markets Report, June 2008; BRSA. 
 
Table 4: Banking sector assets according to equity ownership (%) 
 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 09.2008
State 38.3 31.0 28.0 25.6 25.4
Private 41.4 36.5 31.0 28.9 29.0
Foreign 4.3 12.4 22.4 24.8 25.4
Publicly held 16.0 20.1 18.6 20.7 20.2
 
Source: CBRT Financial Stability Report, May 2008; CBRT. 
 
Note: Publicly held shares include both domestic and foreign investors. 
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Table 5: Selected balance sheet items in selected EU Countries and Turkey (2007) 
 
Assets / 
GDP (%) 
Deposits / 
GDP
(%)
Loans / 
GDP (%)
Loans / 
Deposits 
(%) 
Share of
the Largest
5 Credit
Institutions (%)
Germany 312.12 119 130 109 22
Belgium 392.32 155 126 81 83
Bulgaria 108.09 69 67 97 57
Czech Republic 109.81 73 53 72 66
France 353.14 83 114 137 52
United Kingdom 499.95 290 288 99 41
Latvia 154.57 72 104 145 67
Lithuania 85.01 42 63 152 81
Luxembourg 2,533.27 819 531 65 28
Hungary 107.35 51 65 128 54
Poland 76.79 48 43 91 47
Romania 59.37 32 35 109 56
Greece 167.41 109 87 80 68
Euro zone average 318.48 112 136 121 55
EU-27 average 334.09 136 157 116 59
Turkey 68.14 42 35 83 60
Turkey 06/2008 71.5 44 38 87 59
   
Source: CBRT Financial Stability Report, November 2008. 
 
Note:  The definition of “credit institutions” may differ across countries. 
 
Table 6: Ratio of total household debt to GDP in selected EU countries and Turkey  
 
2005 2006 2007
Lithuania 13.2 19.3 25.9
Czech Republic 14.3 17.3 21.4
Hungary 16.9 21.1 23.2
Latvia 27.1 38.3 43.3
Poland 15.1 18.2 23.7
Italy 27.6 29.2 30.3
Greece 36.2 41.0 40.9
Portugal 67.3 74.3 78.6
Spain 68.6 76.8 80.4
EU-27 54.6 56.4 55.8
Turkey 7.7 9.7 11.7
 
Source: CBRT Financial Stability Report, November 2008. 
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Table 7: Concentration Indicators by Total Assets 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
First 5 banks  57.4 59.0 58.1 61.4 60.9  59.8
First 10 banks  79.3 80.6 82.0 82.9 83.5  82.5
HHI  851.7 904.6 905.9 934.7 911.0  879.1
 
Source: BRSA Structural Developments in Banking, December 2007. 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Indicators of the intermediation level of banks and financial deepening 
 
Years Deposits/GDP Loans/GDP Loans/Deposits
2003 35 17 49
2004 35 20 56
2005 39 25 65
2006 41 30 74
2007 42 35 83
6/2008 44 38 87
 
Source: CBRT Financial Stability Report, May 2008 and November 2008. 
 
Note: Loans include non-performing loans. Deposits include participation funds and 
loans include funds extended by participation banks. 
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Table 9: Foreign capital in the Turkish banking sector (July 2008) 
 
 Bank's share 
in total assets 
Foreign 
Share 
(a) 
Share of 
foreign-owned 
stock exchange 
Total 
foreign 
capital 
share 
(b) 
ABN AMRO BANK 0.2 100 0 100 
AKBANK T.A.Ş. 11.3 10.3 25.8 36.1 
ALBARAKA TURK KATILIM BANKASI A.Ş. 0.7 61.9 11.4 73.3 
ALTERNATIFBANK 0.5 0 0.1 0.1 
ARAP TÜRK B. 0.1 64 0 64 
ASYA KATILIM BANKASI A.Ş. 1.2 0 28 28 
BANK MELLAT 0 100 0 100 
BANKPOZİTİF KREDİ VE KALKINMA BANKASI A.Ş. 0.2 65 0 65 
CALYON BANK T.A.Ş. 0 100 0 100 
CITIBANK 0.7 100 0 100 
DENİZBANK 2.7 75 24.8 99.8 
DEUTSCHE BANK A.Ş. 0.2 100 0 100 
EUROBANK TEKFEN A.Ş. 0.5 93.2 0 93.2 
FİNANSBANK A.Ş. 3.8 51.7 38.3 90 
FORTIS BANK A.Ş. 1.7 65 29.2 94.2 
HABİB BANK 0 100 0 100 
HSBC BANK  2.2 100 0 100 
ING BANK A.Ş. 2.3 100 0 100 
İMKB TAKAS VE SAKLAMA BANKASI A.Ş. 0.3 4.9 0 4.9 
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK 0 100 0 100 
KUVEYT TÜRK EVKAF FİNANS KURUMU A.Ş. 0.7 80.2 0 80.2 
MERRILL LYNCH 0 100 0 100 
MILLENIUM BANK 0.2 100 0 100 
SOCIETE GENERALE 0.1 100 0 100 
ŞEKERBANK 1.1 0 47.3 47.3 
T.EKONOMİ B. 2.1 0 11.7 11.7 
T.GARANTİ B. 11.7 20.8 42.1 62.8 
T.HALK B.  7 0 5.9 5.9 
T.İŞ BANKASI  13 0 21.9 21.9 
T.SINAİ KALKINMA B. 0.8 0 6.6 6.6 
T.VAKIFLAR B. 7.3 0 21.5 21.5 
TAIB YATIRIM BANKASI A.Ş. 0 99.3 0 99.3 
TEKSTİL BANKASI A.Ş. 0.5 0 3.8 3.8 
TURKISH BANK 0.1 40 0 40 
TURKLAND BANK A.Ş. 0.1 100 0 100 
TÜRKİYE FİNANS KATILIM BANKASI A.Ş. 1 60 0 60 
UNICREDIT BANCA Dİ ROMA 0 100 0 100 
WESTLB AG 0.1 100 0 100 
YAPI VE KREDİ B.  9.3 76.2 6.6 82.8 
Sector Total (%)  24.3 17.1 41.5 
 
Source: BRSA Financial Markets Report, June 2008. 
 
Notes: (a) Foreign share = (ratio of foreign share in bank * bank’s assets) / total assets 
of the sector. (b) Total = foreign share + stock market shares.  
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Table 10: Foreign participation in the banking sector in selected EU countries and 
Turkey in 2007 (%) 
 
 Foreign participation (%)
Foreign 
participation (%)
Belgium 24.8 Luxembourg 95.0
Bulgaria 81.6 Poland 70.5
Czech Republic 91.5 Portugal 23.0
France 12.9 Romania 82.1
Germany 11.1 United Kingdom 53.4
Greece 23.2 Euro zone average 19.5
Hungary 57.4 EU-27 average 28.7
Latvia 58.0 Turkey 24.8
Lithuania 83.7 Turkey 06/2008 25.6
 
Source: CBRT Financial Stability Report, November 2008. 
 
 
                                                 
1 See Celasun (1998), Akyüz and Boratav (2003) and Ertuğrul and Selçuk (2001) 
2 In Basel I, banks’ assets were classified into four risk-weight groups (0 percent, 20 percent, 50 percent 
and 100 percent) according to the debtor category (i.e. OECD countries’ governments, banks in OECD 
countries, municipalities and corporations, respectively). 
3 The discussions on these proposals continue, and it seems that they will last long. For more on Basel-I 
and II, see (Yildiran 2008) and the references therein. 
4 These Letters of Intent can be accessed at http://www.imf.org/external/country/tur/index.htm?pn=0 (last  
accessed on January 21, 2009). 
5 These structural issues along with the weak regulatory and supervisory framework were also pointed out 
to be the reason of the negligible presence of foreign banks in the sector till early 2000’s (Ersel 1999).  
6 See Table 2 for a list of failed banks.  
7 See Steinherr et al. (2004) and various reports of the BRSA and CBRT for more details. 
8 This case, which is rather considered to be part of the institutional learning process, staggeringly showed  
how monitoring system could fail to detect looting and illegal reporting practices of banks.  
9 The head of BRSA, Tevfik Bilgin, has announced that BRSA has been closely following the foreign 
banks and that they would not be allowed to transfer the deposits in Turkey to their home countries. 
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